This paper is about such scheduling-type multi-agent projects, where the workflow of each task may contain chance events and decision opportunities. In this case, efficiency requires each agent to make his decisions depending on all the current states of the work processes of all agents. But if the current state of each task is private information of the corresponding agent then we also need to get the agents interested in sharing this information truthfully. In this paper we design a mechanism that implements this cooperative and truthful behaviour of all agents.
Introduction
In this paper, we concentrate on real-life multi-agent projects in which the value of the overall result of all tasks cannot be distributed into the sum of some kind of values of the results of the different tasks. Scheduling problems are important cases in point, for example, when there are parallel tasks and we care only about the latest completion time.
The workflow of most real-life tasks contains chance events and decision opportunities. With such tasks, efficiency requires the agents to make the best decisions considering all earlier chance events of all agents. Continuing with the example of the parallel tasks, it may happen that an agent can choose between a faster and a cheaper way to continue, and if some of the other tasks are doing badly then he is required to choose the cheaper way, but if all are doing well then he is required to choose the faster way.
The real difficulty arises from that the workflow, the chance events and these decisions are private information of the corresponding agent. That is why the agents cannot surely know which would be the best decision for the whole system. Furthermore, for example, if a faster and a slower way differ only in the cost and the probability distribution on the completion time then it is impossible for anyone else to check which way the agent chose. So we want the agents to tell all their private information, even though they can lie, and to make them interested in the best decisions according to the whole system.
In our model, there is a player called the principal(♀) and she can contract with some of the other players called agents(♂) to work with. Each agent can work according to his stochastic decision tree, which contains decision points and chance points as internal nodes, and a result and a real cost at each leaf. Communication is allowed throughout the process and contracts can be made between the principal and each agent such that specifies a payment between them depending on both the achieved result of the agent and the communication between them. At the end, each player gets or pays the money according to his/her contracts, the principal gets the utility corresponding to the set of the achieved results of the agents, and each agent pays the cost of the achieved leaf of his tree.
Example for the process
We consider a project that is very risky, but may gain huge utility. It consists of two tasks, one application per task must be accepted, and if both succeed in time then the principal gets a large sum of money, that is 60 here, but if either fails to do it then the success of the other task has no use. After getting all applications, the principal evaluates all pairs of them for the two different tasks and accepts the pair producing her the most payoff. This example shows the evaluation of a pair of applications of fair agents, and the process of the project provided that the principal accepts this pair.
The applications of these fair agents are based on their stochastic decision trees, and described by the first two trees in Figure 1 , in the following sense. The possible executions of the tasks are the paths from the root to a leaf, where the timing of the events are represented by their heights. The solid squares denote decision points, at which the agent can choose the branch to continue. The other internal nodes denote such chance points at which the branch to continue is chosen randomly with 1/2 probability for each branch. At each leaf, a tick denotes the success or a cross denotes the failure, and the number shows his asked payment: his costs plus a constant. (The numbers on the edges are only to show how these asked payments are calculated.) Each fair agent shows the principal this tree and always shows the current state of his work process, and offers principal to choose the branch at each decision point, and accepts any fair risk for each chance event. At the end, beyond the applied risks, the agent asks for the payment and provides the result at the leaf.
Specifically, the first agent asks 2 units of money beyond his expenses. His task is either started at the beginning with a cost of 5 and probability of the success of 1/2, or he makes preparations ,7 ,7 ,3 ,9 ,9 ,7 ,7 2 7 Figure 1 for a cost of 1, and if the principal asks for it then he can try to complete the task at a later point in time for a cost of 6 with probability of the success of 1/2. In the other application, the cost plus the desired expected payoff of the other task is 7 and the probability of the success is 1/2. The third tree is a "product" of the two trees; that is, it describes the possible overall executions of all tasks. We can construct it by following the applications by time, and creating an appropriate branching if it occurs in one of them, and then continue this on both branches. For example, the path to the 5th leaf from the left describes the pair of the paths to the middle leaf in the first tree and the left leaf in the second tree. In details, the first agent chooses working by the second way, then the second agent fails to complete the task and then the first agent does not try to complete his task. At the bottom, tick denotes the success of both tasks and cross denotes the failure of either, and the number shows the basic total payment asked by the agents.
State means the state of the project at a point in time; it can be represented by a point in the graph of the third tree. We define the values of all states from the bottom to the top, indicated by italics in Figure 1 . Let the value of an endstate be 60 if both tasks succeed and 0 otherwise, minus the total payments. Values of states in the same edge are the same. The value before a decision point is the maximum of the values after. The value before each chance point is the average of the values after.
After the values are calculated, the project would be executed by the following way. At each decision point, the principal asks the corresponding agent to choose the branch with the highest value. At each chance point, the corresponding agent tells the chance event, and the principal pays him the signed difference between the values of the states after and before. At the end, the agents deliver the results and get the payments of the leaf.
For the first agent, this means that the principal asks him -a bit surprisingly -to work in the second way, that is to make only preparations, and then the principal either asks him to do nothing and he gets 3, or she ask him to try to complete the task, and he gets 9 and ±30 for the risk, so he gets 39 if he succeeds, and he pays 21 if he fails. For the second agent this means that he gets 7 and ±12 for the risk, so if he succeeds then he gets 19, but if he fails then he pays 5. (Note that these extremely high risks are the peculiarity more of this simple and risky example than of the mechanism.) This way, the payoff of the principal is surely equal to the value of the starting state because at the end, she gets the value of the endstate, and whenever the value of the current state changes, she pays this difference.
General notions
For any symbol x, the definition of x i -s will also define x as the vector of all meaningful x i -s. x −j means the vector of all x i -s except x j , and (x −j , y) means the vector x by exchanging x j to y.
The term of actions of a player refers to what the player effectively does, and when he does them. The term of information of a player refers to what he knows and believes at a particular point in time. (And he always knows the current time.) His information in all points in time is called as his information history. The strategy set of a player is the set of all functions that assign some probability distribution on his feasible actions to each possible information. Therefore, a game can be defined by the players, their possible actions, information histories and payoffs. A subgame means the game from a point in time, given the earlier history. The outcome of a game means the totality of all events during the game, including their points in time. o G (s) with game G and strategy profile s means the outcome provided the strategy profile s in the game G, as a function of the other parameters of the game, with the probability distributions on these parameters, if exist. The preference is a partial ordering on the outcomes or on the probability distributions of the outcomes. The preference of a player p is denoted by p . A strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if for any strategy
To be interested in a strategy will mean that this gains him p outcome than any other strategy.
For the sake of transparency and gender neutrality, we use feminine or masculine pronouns depending on the gender (♀ or ♂) assigned to the player.
The basic model
We model the problem as the following game G.
Players. There are a player C called the principal(♀) and some players a 1 , ...a n called agents(♂). In subscripts, we use i instead of a i .
Each agent has a stochastic decision tree, which is a rooted branching tree structure consisting of the following terms. The internal nodes of the tree are of two kinds: the chance points and the decision points. To each chance point there is a probability distribution on the edges leaving it. The third kind of nodes is the leaves. Each of them has a result and a real cost assigned. There is a positive real point in time assigned to every node, and for each edge the time assigned to the parent is not later than to the child. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that all such points in time are different.
Working according to the decision tree of an agent means the following. The possible executions of the task are denoted by the paths from the root to a leaf. At a decision point, the agent can choose on which path to continue. At a chance point, the path is chosen randomly with the assigned probabilities, given these probabilities, conditionally independently of his strictly earlier actions and information, and of the not strictly earlier actions and information of all other players; and the agent learns this choice. We call these choices as chance events. We denote the result and the cost of the reached leaf of an agent a i by r i and c i , respectively.
The actions of the players are described by the following process, in chronological order. For the sake of lucidity, this description includes the main events about getting information.
• The principal chooses her strategy and makes it publicly known. (Roughly speaking, she defines the rules.)
• The principal learns a utility function u : {all possible sets of results} → R and each agent learns his decision tree.
After these initial steps, each agent can send any costless certifiable time-stamped instant messages to the principal and vica versa. 1 Beyond this, the process of the game is the following.
• Until time 0, each agent tells to the principal whether he stays in the game.
• At time 0, the principal chooses some of those agents who stay in the game. We call them chosen agents.
• Each chosen agent works according to his decision tree.
• The principal observes the results of the chosen agents and pays some money to them, which can also be negative.
(In fact, we only need to assume that these are some actions of the players, but they can make some other actions as well. Such an action can directly affect only the information of other players.)
The payoffs are determined as follows. Beyond the payments at the end, the principal gets u(r), and each agent a i pays c i . The payoffs of the not chosen agents are 0.
Let us see the information of the players. First, we need the following definition.
The basic information of an agent at any point in time consists of his decision tree, all messages he received strictly earlier from the principal, whether the principal already allowed him to work and his chance events up to and including the current time. The basic information of the principal at a point in time is her utility function u, the agents' decisions (if already made) about whether they stay in the game and the earlier messages she got.
All we assume about the information of the players are the followings.
• The information of each player includes his/her basic information.
• The already mentioned independence between chance events, actions and information holds.
Expectation E is taken only over the chance events. By default, the preference of each agent is to achieve higher expected payoff. Namely, o G (s) i o G (s ) iff with any feasible way of getting information of all players depending on their earlier actions and not later chance events, the expected payoff of a i is not smaller with the strategy profile s than with s .
Interpretation of the model
At the beginning, the principal designs the mechanism by declaring her strategy. Then she can negotiate with each agent, and they can agree on the terms (using her predefined protocol). If they do so then the agent can start to work.
Each agent can affect his work, for example by using more or less workers or be more hurry for some more fatigue, which is equivalent to some more cost. Furthermore, each agent gets feedbacks from his work, such as about unexpected failures, or simply faster or slower progress. The dynamics of them is described by his decision tree.
The players cannot completely observe the executions of the other tasks; for example, it can be happen that no one else can be sure that a later completion of the task of an agent was achieved by a fast and expensive work but with worse luck or by a slow and cheap work with better luck. We handle this aspect by the term of result.
The result can be interpreted so as the certifiable aspects of the execution of the task. So we require the certifiable aspects of the works of the agents to determine the utility of the overall result for the principal.
To put it the other way around, let us call some possible executions of a particular task equivalent if the utility is always the same with both executions, with any executions of the others. Then the results are the equivalence classes of the executions, and we require the result to be certifiable.
In the model, the agents have separate decision trees. However, in many cases like in scheduling problems, the work of an agent may restrain the actions of another one. For example, one cannot start building the roof of a house before someone completes the walls. To resolve this problem, we consider the impossible aggregate executions as possible but causing infinitely bad outcome. Formally, we ignore these restrictions in the decision trees, but we define u = −∞ at all such impossible cases. As u is defined on sets of results, the restricting and the restricted events are always required to be certifiable, more precisely, whether something "impossible" happened must be a function of the results. This means for the example that each result of the agent building the walls must contain the completion time t c , each result of the agent building the roof must contain the starting time t s , and if t s < t c then u = −∞.
To sum up, this model can be applied also in such cases when one's possible decisions can be restricted by some certifiable events in other tasks.
The goal
Definition 1. We call the sum of the payoffs of all players the payoff of the system, and we denote it by p s . Clearly, p s = u(r) − c i . The preference of the system is to achieve higher E(p s ).
To define the fully cooperative behaviour, we define the following game G (1) describing the case when all players in G were the same.
• There is only 1 player (♀).
• Her actions are choosing some of the tasks and making the corresponding decisions while executing them.
• Her information is the utility function u, all decision trees and the not later chance events in all chosen trees.
• Her payoff is p s = u(r) − c i .
Fixing u and the trees, p s is a function of her strategy and the chance events, so E(p s ) depends only on her strategy. As she can simulate any strategy profile in G, the maximum E(p s ) on all strategies in G (1) is an upper bound of E(p s ) in G. The similar statement holds with any subgame H of G, and we denote the maximum E(p s ) in the corresponding one-player game H (1) by f (H) (as a function of u and the trees).
The upper bound of the information of an agent is called his extended information, which consists of the followings.
• In the subgame from the current time, how the outcome depends on the chance events and on the strategies of the players;
• his chance event at the current time;
• the probability distributions of the other chance events, described in the decision trees.
So the information of an agent must be between his basic and extended information. Let his strategy set with basic or extended information mean his strategy set provided that he has basic or extended information history.
Definition 2. With a fixed strategy of the principal, we call a strategy profile of the agents consisting of strategies with basic information as an information-invariant Nash equilibrium, if each agent is interested in keeping his strategy among his strategy set with extended information.
Our main goal is to information-invariantly Nash implement f (G) as E(p s ), namely to find a mechanism and a strategy profile by which
• the strategy profile is an information-invariant Nash equilibrium in the mechanism.
The mechanism
The mechanism means the subgame after the principal declares her strategy.
Definition 3. An application of a i is a function app i : {all possible results} × {all possible further communications between him and the principal} → R, describing his asked payments in the different cases.
We call the following subgame the first price mechanism. The process is the following.
1. Each agent a i submits an application app i .
2. The principal accepts or rejects each application.
3. Agents with accepted applications can work according to their decision trees, and each of them can communicate with the principal.
Let Acc = {i|app i is accepted}. At the end, the payoff p of a rejected agent is 0. If the communication between a i and the principal at step 3. is denoted by com i , then
Let com i→C and com C→i denote the communication from a i to the principal and from the principal to a i , respectively. (Thus com →C = (com i→C |i ∈ Acc) and com C→ = (com C→i |i ∈ Acc).) The above description still does not define the principal's choices of Acc and com C→ . From now on, the principal's strategy means her strategy on these actions (which is also common knowledge). Denote her strategy for com C→ by s c .
After step 1., p(C) depends only on Acc, s c , com →C and r. The principal chooses a strategy by which min com →C ,r p(C) is maximal on all possible cases by her basic information. Maximin payoff will refer to this value.
We assume that this rule determines a unique set of applications to accept, that is, there are no such ties.
Second price mechanism
Definition 4. For any set S of applications, we define the value from the applications, denoted by vf(S), as the maximin payoff of the principal if she receives these applications. Surplus value of an application app i means v + (app i ) = vf (app) − vf (app −i ).
The second price mechanism 2 is the same as the first price mechanism but the principal pays v + (app i ) more to each agent with application app i .
So, denoting the payoffs in the second price mean by p 2 ,
By default, we consider the first price mechanism, and payoff refers to the first price payoff p.
Cost price and fair strategies of agents
We define the cost price application pc(a i ) of an agent a i as the application which can be interpreted as follows. The agent shows his decision tree and defines the following communication protocol between him and the principal. At each decision point, the principal chooses a branch to continue and sends it to the agent. Before each chance point, the principal sends to the agent such real assignments to the branches that's average weighted by the probabilities is 0. At each chance point, the agent chooses a branch to continue and sends it to the principal. At the end, the principal has to pay the cost of the leaf plus for each reached chance point, the money assigned to the chosen branch; and the agent has to deliver the result corresponding to the leaf in time. (If any player deviates from the protocol then, for example, he/she pays ∞.) f air(a i , x) = pc(a i ) + x is called a fair application for any x ∈ R called profit. Sometimes we will consider a fair application in the form of cost price application, with increased costs.
Fair strategy F x of an agent a i means submitting f air(a i , x), and in the case of acceptance, choosing the decisions corresponding to the principal's choice at each decision point, and sending a message about the chance event. Fair agent means an agent with fair strategy, and F 0 is called the cost price strategy. Clearly, fair strategies use basic information.
Evaluation of fair strategies
In this section, we describe more precisely the evaluation shown in the introductory example (1.1).
Consider each agent with fair application with profit x as an agent with x more cost in each leaf of his tree, and with cost price application.
We use the term of the combined decision tree of a set of agents. We can construct it by following the trees of the agents, and creating an appropriate branching in the combined tree if it occurs in one of the trees, and then we continue on all branches. Each result of the combined tree is equivalent to the set of the appropriate results.
The principal evaluates all subsets of app, and accepts all applications in the best set. Consider the evaluation of such a subset. We handle the set as a combined application meaning the offer for contract with all in the set. Notice that the combined application of cost price applications is equivalent to the cost price application of the combined decision tree. (Combined applications can easily be written in the form of application, but we omit the details.)
A state of the combined decision tree means a point (not necessarily vertex) of the graph of the tree, like in the third tree in Figure 1 .
Definition 5. For any state T and expression X, let X|T denote X in the imagined case where the principal accepts one application, which is the cost price application of the subtree from T . Let the value of the state be v(T ) = max
Notice that accepting this application is equivalent to accepting all cost price applications of the corresponding subtrees of the agents, and the value of the starting state is the maximin payoff of the principal provided that she accepts this set of applications.
Theorem 1. The values of the states can be calculated by backward recursion using the followings.
Step 1. The value of an endstate is u(r) − c i
Step 2. Values of states in the same edge are the same.
For each internal node, denote the state just before, and the states just after the node by T and T 1 , ...T n . For chance points, denote the probabilities by w 1 , ...w n , respectively.
Step 3. For a decision point, v(T ) = max i v(T i ).
Step 4. For a chance point, v(T ) = w i v(T i ).
Furthermore, the principal gets the value of the starting state as a fix payoff.
Proof It is clear that these steps enable us to use backward recursion. The first two steps are right by definition.
Step 3. At the only message before the decision point, the principal should ask the corresponding agent for choosing a specified branch to continue. That is why,
Step 4. Let x = w i v(T i ). At the only message before the chance point, the principal should send the assignment vector t = (t 1 , ...t n ) to the branches with ( w i t i =)wt = 0. Then, at the point in time of the chance point, the agent should reply a branch. That is why,
(1)
so using this t at (1), we get
On the other hand,
So from (2) and (3), we get v(T ) = x = w i v(T i ). This recursion also shows that the principal gets the value of the starting state as a fix payoff.
Efficiency of cost price or fair strategies
Lemma 2. The expected payoff of an accepted agent a i with fair strategy and accepted application f air(a i , x) is the profit x.
Proof At each chance point, given its probability distribution described in the decision tree, the principal's assignments to the branches are conditionally independent of the chance event, so the expected value of the assignment to the chosen branch is 0. That is why E(p(a i )) is independent of these assignments, so let us consider them as 0 at each branch. In this case, a i gets from the principal his costs plus the profit x, that is why his payoff is x. Consequently, E(p(a i )) = x.
Proposition 3. Consider the subgame G − of either the first or second price mechanism, starting after the choice of Acc. In this game, if all agents use fair strategy then E(p s ) = f (G − ) and p(C) is fixed.
Proof Let a i use the strategy F x i . Let us denote the subgame starting from a state T by G T . We can determine f (G T ) by the same backward recursion as at Theorem 1. At each endstate, the payoffs of the players are fixed, so instead of Step 1., we have that for each endstate T ,
Steps 2., 3. and 4. are valid with f (G T ) instead of v(T ), too. And it is easy to check that using these steps, we get by induction that f (G T ) = v(T )+ x i holds for every T , including the starting state T 0 . Thus,
, and equality holds at (4), thus p(C) is fixed.
Theorem 4. If all agents use cost price strategy then E(p s ) = f (G).
Proof Because of the previous theorem, what we only have to show is the principal chooses the best set of agents according to the preference of the system. Whichever set is chosen by the principal, the expected payoff of each agent is 0, so E(p s ) = p(C). That is why, when the principal chooses such set of agents by which her minimum payoff becomes the largest possible, then she chooses the set by which E(p s ) becomes the largest possible.
6 Interest in cost price strategy in the second price mechanism Theorem 5. In the second price mechanism, cost price strategy profile is an information-invariant Nash equilibrium.
Proof 1
The outline of the proof is as follows. We consider an agent which we denote by a 1 and assume that all other agents use cost price strategy. Then we will prove that E(p 2 (a 1 )) ≤ f (G) − vf (app −1 ), and equality holds if a 1 also uses cost price strategy. As the right side is independent of the strategy of a 1 , this will prove the equilibrium. Consider a mixed mechanism which is second price for a 1 and first price for the other agents, namely the payoffs of the players are the followings:
Clearly, the payoff and the preference both of a 1 and of the system are the same here as in the second price mechanism. Lemma 2 shows that p * (a i ) = p(a i ) = 0 for all i = 1. Theorem 4 shows that if a 1 uses cost price strategy then E(p s ) is the largest possible.
and equality holds when a 1 is fair. Consequently,
and equality holds if a 1 also uses cost price strategy.
Proof 2
We use the same solution concept. Using the equations
and if
Corollary 6. The second price mechanism information-invariantly Nash implements f (G) as E(p s ).
7 Interest in fair strategy in the first price mechanism Definition 6. The value v of an application is the maximin payoff of the principal on her such strategies by which she accepts this application; that is,
v(app i ) ≤ vf (app), with equality iff app i is accepted. Furthermore, app i is accepted iff v(app i ) > vf (app −i ). That is why v + (app i ) = max(0, v(app i ) − vf (app −i )).
The value of a fair application is the value of the cost price application minus the profit. So for a particular agent, there is exactly one fair application with a given value.
Theorem 7. For an arbitrary agent a i and value x, if every other agent is fair then the fair strategy of a i gains him the highest expected payoff among all those strategies that use an application of this value.
Proof Consider again the profits of the other agents as constant costs, so their strategies are considered to be cost price strategies; it does not modify the preference of the system. As the acceptance depends on the value, we should consider only the case when the value is big enough to accept. Let us increase the cost of each leaf of the tree of a i by as much as makes the value of his cost price application x. It decreases his payoff by a fix amount, so it does not modify his preference.
. If a i uses cost price strategy then equality holds and Theorem 4 shows that it makes E(p s ) the largest possible. That is why, the best for a i among such strategies is his cost price strategy. With the original costs, this means that the best for him is his fair strategy of the value.
First we describe the result more intuitively, then we present the formal results in the subsections.
For a strategy s i with application app i , and for a real number x, let s i +x mean the same strategy as s i but with application app i + x, and let the emphstrategy form F orm(s i ) = {s i + x|x ∈ R}. Let F = {F x |x ∈ R} called the fair strategy form.
Let us fix everything in the game except the chance events and the strategy of a i . Let p i (s i ) mean E(p(a i )) if he uses the strategy s i . If both applications app i and app i + x would be accepted then
3 so this sum depends only on the strategy form. We call this sum as the value of the strategy form v(F orm(s i )).
In each strategy form F orm there exists an only strategy s i , using application app i , for which app i − x would be accepted if x > 0 and rejected if x < 0. Then
, so his strategy form with the greatest value gains to a i the highest potential for his expected payoff. Another question is expectedly how much he could exploit this potential, in the Bayesian mean.
Theorem 7 implies that the fair strategy form has the greatest value. Moreover, p i (F x ) = {x if v(F ) > x; and 0 otherwise}, which is a quite efficient way for the exploitation of this potential.
Interest in cost price strategy with perfect competition
The principal accepts the applications with the greatest values. This justifies the following definition.
Definition 7.
We define the perfect competition as the mechanism with the following preferences of the agents. Each agent prefers the case when his expected payoff would be nonnegative if the principal chose her maximin strategy on her such strategies by which she accepts the application of this agent. Of those, he prefers submitting an application with the greater value.
Theorem 8. In first price mechanism with perfect competition, cost price strategy of all agents is an information-invariant Nash equilibrium.
Proof Assume that every agent except a i uses cost price strategy. What we have to prove is a i is interested in using cost price strategy, as well. If p(a i ) ≥ 0 then
and equality holds if a i also uses cost price strategy. So this inequality gives an upper bound for his preference, which can always be achieved with cost price strategy.
Corollary 9. The first price strategy information-invariantly Nash implements f (G) as E(p s ) with perfect competition.
First price mechanism with imperfect competition
We use some imprecise descriptions when it is unambiguous and the precise way would be too broad.
We assume here that the information of each agent a i contains a feasible probability distribution on everything in the game including the strategies of others, and we use probability P i and expected value E i also on this probability distribution.
Definition 8. Let the signed surplus value of an application app
Clearly, v + (app i ) = max(v ± (app i ), 0) and v ± (app i ) > 0 iff app i is accepted. With a fixed agent a i and application
In practice, V and D are almost independent and both have "natural" distributions, so P i (e < V ) = P (E i (D|D < V ) < V ) is usually not smaller than P i (D < V ). This observation shows the importance of the following theorem.
holds for any i and app i , and this is common knowledge among the agents then a fair strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium.
Proof Denote the strategy of a i by s i using application app i and let g(s i ) = E i (p(a i )|s i ) and x be the number by which g(F x ) is the largest possible. So if g(F x ) ≥ g(s i ) for all s i then a i is interested in using fair strategy.
We prove that if all but an agent a i use fair strategy then a i is interested in using a fair strategy. Theoretically, let us allow only for a i to submit an application f air(app i ) in which he submits the fair application with the same value as which v(app i ) would be if he submitted app i instead. Denote the fair strategy but with application f air(app i ) by F (app i ).
we get g(F e ) = P i (e < V )e, and g(F (app i )) = P i (D < V )e, whence we can simply get that
) so s i cannot be a better strategy. That is why assume that e > 0. In this case, (P i (e < V ) − P i (D < V ))e ≥ 0. If s i is fair then D is constant, so both sides are the same.
• Proposition 3 implies that g(F (app i )) − g(s i ) ≥ 0.
• g(F x ) − g(F e ) ≥ 0 by the definition of x.
To sum up, g(F x ) − g(s i ) ≥ 0, which proves the equilibrium.
Coalitions
In this section, we consider the case when we have disjoint sets of agents, called coalitions, and each agent in a coalition prefers the higher total expected payoff of all in his coalition. Submitting more applications by the same agent is equivalent to submitting one application in which the agent shows all and offers the principal to choose some of them. That is why if a coalition played as one agent, called consortium, with their combined decision tree, their overall information and the default preference, then this consortium would be able to simulate the case of playing so as different agents in a coalition. So if allowed, each coalition would better forming a consortium, by which we get the original game with this new set of agents.
As a consequence, if the competition remains perfect with this new set of players then the mechanism remains efficient.
Reliance in the principal
Assume that the principal knows that all agents use fair strategy. Then, with the corresponding modifications, she can consider them as agents with cost price strategies. In this case the expected payoffs of all agents are 0. That is why E(p(C)) = E(p s ) ≤ f (G), and Theorem 4 shows that equality holds if the principal uses her declared strategy. To sum up, the principal is interested in choosing her declared strategy. (Even if the principal is risk-averse because she gets f (G) as a fix payoff.)
Conclusion
In the second price mechanism, the revelation strategy profile is an information-invariant Nash equilibrium, and this way the expected payoff of the system is the largest possible, including the possibilities of making one's decision depending on the earlier chance events of others.
In the first price mechanism, with some assumption (or approximation), there is a Nash equilibrium consisting of the same strategies but with asking a constant more money -his expected payoff in the case of acceptance -in each application.
The disadvantage of the first price mechanism over the second price one is that it requires a competition on each task, and it is fully efficient only with perfect competition.
The advantages of the first price mechanisms are 1. forming cartels of agents does not worsen the process as long as it does not decrease the competition, while in the second price mechanism, if two agents can submit such applications that are useless without each other then they may get as much payoff as they want (see 10.1);
2. the agents need (almost) no reliance in the principal.
9 Extensions and consequences of the model 9.1 When the principal also has a decision tree
Consider the extension of the model when the principal also has a decision tree, and the utility depends on her result, too. Consider here this extended principal(♀) as two players, one is considered as an indispensable agent with the decision tree who declares that he uses cost price strategy, and the other is the principal in the original meaning with her strategy of the first or second price mechanism. In the second price mechanism, we omit paying the surplus value of the application of this fictive agent. Then the expected payoff of the extended principal and the principal are the same, and all statements hold with this new set of players, that is why this mechanism in the extended model is the same good as the original mechanism in the original model. Using this strategy of the extended principal is equivalent to choosing the strategy by which her minimum expected payoff only on her own chance events is the highest possible.
When agents also have utility functions
Consider the extension of the model when some agent a i has a utility function u i which is 0 if a i is rejected, and may depend on the work of others if a i is accepted, that is, p(a i ) = a i (r i , com i ) + u i (o)−c i . Let us allow making such applications and contracts that specify the payment depending also on the results of other contracted agents. Then we define cost price application by the same way, but decreased by u i . This way, with some corresponding changes, all that we have shown above remains true.
Modifications during the process
In practice, the decision trees can be extremely difficult, that is why submitting the precise fair applications is not expectable. Therefore, they can present it only in a simplified, approximating way. Generally, such inaccuracies do not significantly worsen the optimality; nevertheless, this loss can be much more reduced by the following observation.
Assume that someone whose application has been accepted can refine his decision tree during the process. It would be beneficial to allow him to carry out such modifications. The question is: on what conditions?
The answer is for us to allow modifications of applications, if the agent pays the difference between the values of the current states with the original and the new applications. From another point of view, considering the possible applications with the restriction of the earlier communication, an agent can exchange his application to another one with the same value in the restricted mean. As it is shown at Theorem 7, exchanging to his true fair application is in his interest, and such modifications gains him as much more expected payoff as to the system. Equivalently, each possible modification can be handled so as a chance point in the original application with 1 and 0 probabilities for continuing with the original and the modified application, respectively. (Or more precisely, as the limit of the cases when these probabilities tend to 1 and 0.) Because at such chance point, the principal assigns 0 to the branch of not modifying and the difference between the values of the states after and before, to the modification.
It may happen that in the beginning it is too costly for some agent to explore the many improbable branches of his decision tree, especially if he does not yet know whether his application will be accepted; but later however, it would be worth exploring better the ones that became probable. This kind of in-process modifications is what we want to make possible. We show that the interest of each agent in better scheduling of these modifications is about the same as the interest of the system in it.
The expected payoff of an agent with an accepted fair application is fixed and for a nearly fair agent, the small modifications of the other applications have negligible effect. As the modifications of each agent have no influence on the payoff of the principal and only this negligible influence on the expected payoff of other agents, the change of the expected payoff of the system is essentially the same as the change of the expected payoff of this agent. This confirms the above statement.
On the other hand, it is clear that if the utility function alters somewhat then everything can be rescheduled according to the new goals. Moreover, the principal is interested in describing her utility function in the same schedule as which is the best according to the preference of the system.
Further theoretical observations

Coalitions in the second price mechanism
In the second price mechanism, consider the case when two agents can submit such applications that are useless without each other. Assume that their cost price applications would be accepted. If either of them decreased the cost of his application by x then the surplus value of both application would increase by x, so totally they get 2x compensation, by which they get x more total payoff. Using this trick, these players can get as much payoff as they want.
Simplifications and the case with no parallel tasks
The messages the principal sends depend only on the earlier messages she got. That is why if an agent a i is sure that the principal receives no message from anyone else in the time interval I = [t 1 , t 2 ] then, without decreasing the value of his application, a i can ask the principal (in the application) to send at t 1 that what messages she would send during I depending on the messages she would have got from a i before. Similarly, if the principal surely does not send any message to anyone else during I then the agent can send all his messages only until t 2 , and during I, and the principal should send to a i that which messages she would send depending on the messages she would have got before.
As an application, consider the following project. It consists of two tasks, and the second task can only be started after the first one accomplished. The result of each agent for the first task (called first agent) consists of his completion time C 1 . The result of each second agent consists of his starting time S 2 and the time C 2 he completes; and his decision tree starts with doing nothing until an optional point in time S 2 , and then he can start his work. The utility function is of the form f (C 2 ) for some decreasing function f : {time} → {money} if C 1 ≥ S 2 , and −∞ otherwise. In this case, the principal always communicates only with the agent who is just working at the time. So using the above observation, we can make simplified applications of the following form with the same values as of the fair applications.
In short, the first agents tell that for how much money would they complete the first task depending on the penalty, and the applied penalty for the chosen second agent is the loss form the delayed completion, and the penalty for the first agent is how much more the second agent asks if he can start later. The principal chooses the pair that gains her the most payoff.
Formally, the form of the application of the first agents is "We ask h(C 1 ) − g 1 (h) money for any h : {time} → {money} chosen by the principal at the beginning", and for the second agents this is "We ask f (C 2 ) − g 2 (S 2 ) money if we can start our work at S 2 and we complete it at C 2 ". h(C 1 ) and f (C 2 ) describe the penalties here. In the simplified fair applications, g 1 and g 2 are chosen in such a way that make their expected payoff independent of the arguments, if the agents use their best strategies afterwards. If all applications are so then the principal chooses a pair for which g 1 (g 2 ) is the greatest. Then she chooses h = g 2 for the first agent, and this way the principal gets f (
If a first agent has no choice in his decision tree, that is, his completion time C 1 is simply a probabilistic variable, then he should choose g 1 (h) = E(h(C 1 )) − c, where c is his costs plus his profit.
Controlling and controlled players
For an example, consider a task of building a unit of railroad. An agent a 1 can make this task for a cost of 100, but with 1% probability of failure, which would cause a huge loss 10, 000. Another agent a 2 could inspect and in the case of failure, correct the work of a 1 under the following conditions. The inspection costs 1. If the task was correct then he does nothing else. If not, he detects and correct the failure with 99% probability for a further cost 100, but he does not detect, so he does nothing with 1% probability. If both of them use cost price strategy and they are the accepted agents for the task then the mechanism works in the following way.
At the end, a i gets 101.99 but pays 199 (totally he pays 97.01) compensation if he fails. a 2 gets 1 if he correctly finds the task to be correct, he gets 200 if the task was wrong but he corrects it, but he pays 9800 if he misses correcting it.
Of course, with fair applications each of them gets his profit more payment. It can be checked that the expected payoff of each agent is his profit independently of the behaviour of the others, and the payoff of the principal is fixed.
Omitting the assignments of the principal
The fair agents make no use of the assignments of the principal at the chance points. Let us investigate what if we skipped these messages from the mechanism. In this case, the payment to each agent a i no longer depends only on r i and com i but it also depends on com →C . That is why it would require from the agents much more reliance in the principal. But everything else we have shown remained true without the use of these messages.
A consequence for 2-player cooperation
Consider the case when a player a simply wants to make an offer for cooperation with another player c. We can consider a as an extended agent as in Section 9.2, c as an extended principal as in Section 9.1 and the offer of a as an application. Then c should accept or reject the application depending only on her expected payoff if she accepted it. By definition, this payoff equals the value of the application, and Theorem 7 shows that the fair application of all applications with the same value gains to a the highest expected payoff in the case of acceptance.
11 Observations for application 11.1 Necessity of being informed about the own process
We assumed that none of the chosen players knew better anything about any chance event of any other chosen agent. We show here an example that fails this requirement and it makes the mechanism wrong. Consider two agents a and b that will surely be accepted. Assume that a believes the probability of an unfavourable event in his work to be 50 %, but another one, called B knows that the probability is 60%, he knows the estimation of a and he also knows that at a particular decision point of him, he will be asked for the decision corresponding to this chance event. It can be checked that if the application of a is fair then if b increases the asked payment in his application of the more probable case by an amount of money and decreases it in the other case by the same amount then the value of his application remains the same but this way, he bets 1 : 1 with b on an event of 60% probability.
In order to restrain such losses, a could rightfully say that larger bet can only be increased on worse conditions. Submitting reasonable application with concave valuability function makes something similar, which is another reason to use this.
Risk-averse agents
Assume that an agent a i has a strictly monotone valuability funcion g : R → R and he wants to maximize E(g(p(a i ))). We have seen safety use of the case when g is concave in Section 11.1. Definition 9. We define an application reasonable as the same as the fair application with the only difference that at the end, the principal pays g −1 (g(cost of the leaf ) + chance event (assigned value to the chosen branch)).
By a reasonable application, in the case of acceptance, the expected valuability of the utility of the agent is independent of the choices of the principal. If all applications are reasonable then the payoff of the principal remains fixed. If the agent is risk-neutral then the reasonable application is fair. These are some reasons why reasonable applications work "quite good". We do not state that it is optimal in any sense, but a reasonable application may be better than a fair application in the risk-averse case.
We note that the evaluation of reasonable applications can be much more difficult than of fair applications, but if for each agent, g(x) is of the form a−b·e −λx then a similar evaluation algorithm works.
Agents with limited funds
This section is only a suggestion for the cases with such agents, and it is not optimal in any sense.
Our mechanism requires each agent to be able to pay so much money as the maximum possible damage he could have caused. But in many cases, there may be a plenty of agents who cannot satisfy this requirement. However, accepting such agent a may be a good decision, if a is reliable to some degree.
To solve this problem, a should find someone who has enough funds, and who takes the responsibility, for example for an appropriate fee. If the agent is reliable to some degree then he should be able to find such insurer player b. (It can be even the principal, but considered as another player.) This method may also be used when a has enough funds, but he is very risk-averse.
Here, a and b work similarly as a controlled and a controlling parties in Section 10.3. The difference is that b does not work here, and he knows the probability distribution of the result of a not from his own decision tree but from his knowledge about the reliability of a. This shows that the role of b can be combined with his role in Section 10.3.
Risk level
If all agents are fair then at each chance point, the money assigned to each branch is the difference between the expected payoffs of the system after and before. That is why, in many cases, the risks of the agents are acceptable. For example, in an ordinary case, being late can cause at most as much penalty as much loss could be caused by this much more late in the project.
Communication
The model requires the communication to be certifiable. This can simply be made using a cryptographic communication protocol.
Applications in genetic programming
This second price mechanism may also be useful in genetic programming, when we want to find an efficient algorithm for such a problem that can be distributed into slightly dependent subproblems, while the subprograms for these subproblems should cooperate, and their overall achievement is what we can evaluate. In this case we should experiment such subprograms parallelly that also submits applications, and we simulate here a competitive market with a principal that uses our second price mechanism.
If the form of all possible cost price applications for each subproblem is simple enough then we may need to experiment less parameters in each subproblems than in the original problem, and that is why this method converges faster.
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